FALL 2025

SPRING 2026

Abstract. Auctioneers suspecting bidder collusion often lack the formal evidence needed for legal recourse. A practical alternative is to design auctions that hinder collusion. Since Abreu et al. (1986), economic theory has emphasized imperfect monitoring as a constraint on collusion, but evidence remains scarce on whether: (i) information frictions meaningfully limit real-world collusion; and (ii) auctioneers can effectively exploit these frictions. Indeed, transparency concerns prevent the introduction of explicit randomness in auction design. We make progress on this issue by studying the impact of subjective scoring in auctions run by Japan’s Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transportation. The adoption of scoring auctions significantly reduced winning bids in ways inconsistent with competition. Model-based inference suggests that the cartel’s dynamic obedience constraints were binding and tightened by imperfect monitoring. Subjective scoring can successfully leverage imperfect monitoring frictions to reduce the scope of collusion.


Abstract. (coming soon)


Abstract. Industrial decarbonization requires significant investments in abatement technology. Yet if firms have market power, their incentive to invest may deviate from the socially optimal level -- even after carbon externalities have been appropriately priced -- because they do not fully internalize the consumer gains from reduced prices or they face preemption motives in deterring rival firms. We explore the implications of market power for technology adoption and efficient policy in the context of the U.S. cement industry. We first estimate a dynamic model drawing on data over 1974-2019, where we endogenize firm decisions to adopt new technology or retire old technology. We then use counterfactual simulations to examine how firms respond alternative policy design.