FALL 2026

Abstract: We develop a network-based screening framework to evaluate the effects of horizontal acquisitions. Leveraging tools from network theory, we show that the effect of a change in ownership can be locally decomposed into an upward-pricing-pressure component and a network-centrality component that captures how pricing pressure propagates through the system of competing products. For full mergers, the change in network-centrality summarizes the unilateral effect, yielding a screening statistic that can be computed with data commonly available in merger investigations. Using price and quantity data from the European automobile industry, we show that the network model matches substitution patterns and simulated merger effects from a random-coefficients nested-logit benchmark. We further show that changes in centrality provide substantial incremental explanatory power for predicted price effects beyond both the Gross Upward Pricing Pressure Index and changes in concentration. In screening exercises, we quantify the gains from complementing traditional screening tools with centrality-based rules.


Abstract: We build a panel of US slaughterhouse locations from USDA inspection records, and link this panel to the universe of animal welfare violations and enforcement actions at meat facilities. We find that violations are concentrated among a small share of facilities, and that small facilities violate at higher rates than large ones. Violations at an acquired slaughterhouse shift towards the parent company average -- slaughterhouses increase violations when acquired by a high-violator parent company and decrease when acquired by a low violator parent company.


Abstract: I model a two-product incumbent that can sell its products separately and/or bundled. Potential entrants with different costs constrain its prices and product offerings. To capture the cost of product-offering complexity, which is essential for understanding tying, the model assumes a fixed cost of a product offering. It also assumes a fixed cost of the underlying products. Such costs are essential for capturing tying to foreclose a more efficient entrant, but they can also give rise to high prices with mixed bundling, which is not tying, compared to pure bundling, which is. Thus, while anticompetitive tying is possible, an overly hostile legal treatment of tying can result in consumer harm.

SPRING 2026

FALL 2025