FALL 2026

Abstract: I model a two-product incumbent that can sell its products separately and/or bundled. Potential entrants with different costs constrain its prices and product offerings. To capture the cost of product-offering complexity, which is essential for understanding tying, the model assumes a fixed cost of a product offering. It also assumes a fixed cost of the underlying products. Such costs are essential for capturing tying to foreclose a more efficient entrant, but they can also give rise to high prices with mixed bundling, which is not tying, compared to pure bundling, which is. Thus, while anticompetitive tying is possible, an overly hostile legal treatment of tying can result in consumer harm.


Abstract: We build a panel of US slaughterhouse locations from USDA inspection records, and link this panel to the universe of animal welfare violations and enforcement actions at meat facilities. We find that violations are concentrated among a small share of facilities, and that small facilities violate at higher rates than large ones. Violations at an acquired slaughterhouse shift towards the parent company average -- slaughterhouses increase violations when acquired by a high-violator parent company and decrease when acquired by a low violator parent company.


SPRING 2026

FALL 2025