FALL 2026

Abstract: We develop a network-based screening framework to evaluate the effects of horizontal acquisitions. Leveraging tools from network theory, we show that the effect of a change in ownership can be locally decomposed into an upward-pricing-pressure component and a network-centrality component that captures how pricing pressure propagates through the system of competing products. For full mergers, the change in network-centrality summarizes the unilateral effect, yielding a screening statistic that can be computed with data commonly available in merger investigations. Using price and quantity data from the European automobile industry, we show that the network model matches substitution patterns and simulated merger effects from a random-coefficients nested-logit benchmark. We further show that changes in centrality provide substantial incremental explanatory power for predicted price effects beyond both the Gross Upward Pricing Pressure Index and changes in concentration. In screening exercises, we quantify the gains from complementing traditional screening tools with centrality-based rules.


Abstract: We build a panel of US slaughterhouse locations from USDA inspection records, and link this panel to the universe of animal welfare violations and enforcement actions at meat facilities. We find that violations are concentrated among a small share of facilities, and that small facilities violate at higher rates than large ones. Violations at an acquired slaughterhouse shift towards the parent company average -- slaughterhouses increase violations when acquired by a high-violator parent company and decrease when acquired by a low violator parent company.



Abstract: When price discovery is necessary for time-sensitive goods, a common practice is to conduct an auction for each item sequentially, but dynamic incentives can lead to behavior distinct from static settings. We provide a novel empirical analysis of a large-scale sequential market that employs auctions to allocate objects to firms with budget constraints, leveraging a unique proprietary dataset of the online advertising market. In this market, because of their short-run budget constraints, participants face a tradeoff between winning auctions immediately or holding out for later opportunities. This dynamic incentive prompts them to adjust their entry rates and bidding strategies accordingly. We develop and estimate a finite-horizon dynamic game between bidders with heterogeneous budgets facing a sequence of simultaneous auctions to quantify this incentive and analyze its implication in competition and auction design. We find that a substantial markdown occurs due to the dynamic incentives arising from budget constraints, and this markdown varies significantly among bidders with different budgets. Using the estimated structural model, we provide a counterfactual simulation comparing the first-price and secondprice formats. Unlike the standard environment, we find that dynamics and heterogeneous budgets lead to a significant disparity in the welfare distributions under them. This highlights that even a seemingly simple mechanism choice can have competitive implications in such a dynamic environment.



Abstract: I model a two-product incumbent that can sell its products separately and/or bundled. Potential entrants with different costs constrain its prices and product offerings. To capture the cost of product-offering complexity, which is essential for understanding tying, the model assumes a fixed cost of a product offering. It also assumes a fixed cost of the underlying products. Such costs are essential for capturing tying to foreclose a more efficient entrant, but they can also give rise to high prices with mixed bundling, which is not tying, compared to pure bundling, which is. Thus, while anticompetitive tying is possible, an overly hostile legal treatment of tying can result in consumer harm.

SPRING 2026

FALL 2025